Battle of Deir ez-Zor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Deir_ez_Zor--------------------------------------
дополнительно:
Indian and Vichy French Forces in the Battle of Deir-ez-Zor, June 30-July 3, 1941
v.1.0 May 26, 2002
Ravi Rikhye
Source: Indian Armed Forces in World War II: Campaign in Western Asia [Historical Section, India and Pakistan, 1957]
The British-Indian Army fought five campaigns in the Western Theatre during World War II:
North African Campaign
East African Campaign
Campaign in Western Asia
Campaign in Italy
Operations in Greece
The operations of this army in North and East Africa and in Italy are well known. The Campaign in Western Asia is obscure, mainly because actions were small-scale.
The British occupied Iran, Iraq, and Syria during the early years of World War II because they feared:
German troops driving into the Caucuses would seek to capture oil production facilities in this region
Turkey and Germany would create problems for Britain in Syria and Iraq
Vichy French forces in Syria, increasingly coming under German influence, would work against British interests
To prevent this, an enormous deployment consisting of 9th and 10th Armies was stationed in the area. Conflict with Vichy France in Syria was one result.
The battle of Deir ez Zor in Syria took place because Indian 10th Division [Major-General William J. Slim] was ordered to move from Iraq up the Euphrates River to Aleppo in Syria, thus threatening Vichy French forces at Beirut. Other columns were simultaneously tasked to take various other objectives.
The tasks given to 10th Division, as listed in the Official History were:
To advance from Abu Kemal (just west of the Iraq-Syria border) and seize Deir ez Zor
To deal with any Vichy French forces encountered
To defeat any irregular opposition in the area, such as the forces operating under the Palestine guerilla leader, Fawzi Qawukji
To prepare for an advance to Aleppo
To create among local tribes a friendly attitude for the Allied cause
The division’s 20th Indian Infantry Brigade was left in Mosul, in northwest Iraq, facing Turkey. The brigade would demonstrate with a force built around 2/8th Gurkha Rifles to the north of the Euphrates to assist the advance of 21st Indian Infantry Brigade Group, which was the striking force. 25th Indian Infantry Brigade Group was to protect the line of communications between the objective and Baghdad. An independent battalion, 3/11th Sikhs, under command to 10th Division, was to protect the Kirkuk-Hafia pipeline.
Another force was to operate to the north of 20th Indian Brigade; to the south, yet another force was already engaged in operations around Palmyra, which lay along the route of the pipeline from Iraq to Tripoli on the Mediterranean coast.
The terrain consisted of plains desert with little water and vast distances. For tacticians, the significance of the operation was that relatively small, fully motorized forces were sent over the long distances to attack enemy positions from multiple directions with wide outflanking moves. These were among the first motorized mobile operations conducted by the British Indian Army: long distances were being covered in the East and North African theatres, but large numbers of troops still walked as troops had done for millennia. The official historian notes the risks in such operations, but also emphasizes the rewards. Vichy forces were scattered through Syria, and though they had a considerable air superiority, were unable in the slightest to counter the Indians’ mobile offensive. Of course, the official historian wrote from the comfortable aftermath of success. Had these various columns and forces been cut up and destroyed – which could as easily have been the case – presumably he would have different things to say about the risks and rewards of mobile operations.
The operation was also of significance because it helped to further enhance the reputation of the 10th Division’s GOC, the future Field Marshal William J. Slim. We will read more of him when we start on the British-Indian Army’s campaigns in the Eastern Theatre.
Indian forces were commanded by British officers, as was the norm at this time. A few Indian officers had reached major’s rank, much more prevalent were Indian captains and lieutenants. Platoon commanders were invariably Indian Junior Commissioned Officers.
21st Indian Infantry Brigade [Brig. Weld]
21st Brigade Signal Section
- 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles
- 2/4th (Prince of Wales’ Own) Gurkha Rifles
- 2/10th Gurkha Rifles
Under Command:
127th Fighter Squadron, RAF
13th Lancers
157th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (a British regiment)
9th Field Company (engineers)
29th Field Ambulance
Detachment, 7th Motor Ambulance Section
16th (Mobile) Workshop Company
17th, 21st, and 25th Indian Infantry Brigade Transport Companies
35th General Purpose Transport Company
[The Under Command arises because almost all these troops were from division. The orbat makes clear the manner in which almost the entire transport of the division was pooled to motorize 21st Brigade.]
Vichy French Forces (as of June 19th, 1941) Aleppo
One battalion Troupes Speciales (native troops)
4th Battalion, Levant Infantry
4th Squadron, North Syrian Cavalry
One 75mm battery
2nd Group, Regiment Chasseurs d’Afrique (Metropolitan)
Dier-ez-Zor – Abu Kemal – Tell Abibab
One battalion Troupes Speciales
6th Battalion, Levant Infantry
2nd Light Desert Company
2nd Light Mechanized Unit
2nd Group, 2nd Levant Metropolitan Artillery
Tell Kolcheck – Qamichliye
8th Battalion, Levant Infantry
21st, 23rd, 25th, 28th Light Squadrons, Djejirah Cavalry